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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Following a jury trial, Carl Pickens, Jr. was found guilty of rape, first degree 
kidnapping, and assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). In addition, he 
was determined to be a persistent violator of the law and, thus, was eligible for a 
sentencing enhancement. At his sentencing hearing, Mr. Pickens received the following 
concurrent sentences: for rape, life, with 35 years fixed; for first degree kidnapping, 25 
years, all fixed; for assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), ten years, all 
fixed; and, for being a persistent violator, life, with 45 years fixed. 
Mr. Pickens appealed. On appeal, he contends that: (1) his conviction and 
punishment for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesser-included offense of 
assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape), twice placed him in jeopardy for 
the same offense and, therefore, violated both the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions; and (2) allowing the prosecutor to present argument and evidence 
implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts was error because that evidence was 
clearly inadmissible and highly prejudicial. 
The State has conceded a double jeopardy violation and aggress with 
Mr. Pickens that his conviction for assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape) 
should be vacated; however, it argues that there was no error in allowing the prosecutor 
to present argument and evidence implicating Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts. The 
purpose of this Reply Brief is to respond to the State's arguments on the latter issue. 
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ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Pickens twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense when he was 
convicted and sentenced for both the greater offense of rape, and the lesser-
included offense of assault with intent to commit a serious felony (rape)? 
2. Was it error to permit the State to offer evidence and argument implicating 
Mr. Pickens in certain prior bad acts, where that evidence was clearly 




Mr. Pickens Was Twice Put In Jeopardy For the Same Offense When He Was 
Convicted Of. And Sentenced For. The Greater Offense Of Rape. As Well As The 
Lesser-Included Offense Of Assault With Intent To Commit A Serious Felony (Rape) 
Mr. Pickens argues that, because assault with intent to commit a serious felony 
(rape) is a lesser-included offense of rape, his conviction and punishment for both 
offenses violated his Constitutional right not to be placed in jeopardy for the same 
offense twice. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-14.) The State agrees with Mr. Pickens' position 
on this issue. (Respondent's Brief, pp.12-17.) Accordingly, no further discussion of this 
issue is necessary and Mr. Pickens urges this Court to vacate his conviction for assault 
with intent to commit a serious felony (rape). 
11. 
The District Court Erred In Permitting The State To Offer Evidence And Argument 
Implicating Mr. Pickens In Certain Prior Bad Acts Because That Evidence Was Clearly 
Inadmissible And Highly Prejudicial To Mr. Pickens' Defense 
A. Introduction 
During the opening statement phase of Mr. Pickens' trial, the prosecutor informed 
the jury that it would hear evidence that, immediately after the alleged rape, Mr. Pickens 
told a nearby witness that "[t]his time it's not my fault." (Tr. Vol. V, p.151, Ls.5-13 
(emphasis added).) Later, during the State's presentation of its case-in-chief, two 
witnesses testified that Mr. Pickens had, in fact, stated "this time it's not my fault." (See, 
e.g., Tr. Vol. V, p.242, L.24 - p.244, L.4, p.416, Ls.1-7, p.416, Ls.14-22.) 
On appeal, Mr. Pickens asserts two claims related to the arguments and 
evidence concerning his alleged statement that "this time, it's not my fault": first, he 
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contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by revealing the alleged quote to 
the jury during her opening statement when she knew, or should have known, that that 
quote was inadmissible because no prior notice had been given in accordance with 
I.R.E. 404(b) (Appellant's Brief, pp.19-25); second, he asserts that the district court's 
ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence was in error-both because the State 
failed to provide prior notice of its intent to use the evidence (as is required under Rule 
404(b)), and because the evidence is irrelevant or, if somewhat relevant, its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-30). 
In response, the State has focused primarily on Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial 
misconduct claim, arguing that no misconduct occurred and, even if it did, it was 
harmless; however, interspersed with the State's misconduct arguments are arguments 
that could certainly be construed as applying Mr. Pickens' evidentiary claim. (See 
generally Respondent's Brief, pp.17-29.) For the reasons set forth below though, the 
State's arguments are without merit and, as was argued in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's 
Brief, the district court erred in permitting the State to offer evidence and argument 
regarding Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my fault." 
B. The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct When, During Her Opening Statement, 
She Quoted Mr. Pickens As Saying That "This Time It's Not My Fault," Knowing 
That The State Had Not Provided Any Notice Of Its Intent To Use Evidence Of 
Prior Bad Acts 
In its Respondent's Brief, the State offers a number of reasons why it believes 
that Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial misconduct argument fails. It argues that that claim is 
procedurally barred (Respondent's Brief, p.24); it claims that the prosecutor could not 
have engaged in misconduct for highlighting evidence which she knew, or should have 
known, was inadmissible under 1.R.E. 404(b) because, in fact, that evidence was not 
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inadmissible under I.RE. 404(b) because it did not even fall within the scope of Rule 
404(b) (Respondent's Brief, pp.19, 20-23); it contends that, even if the evidence in 
question was inadmissible under Rule 404(b), the prosecutor cannot be shown to have 
engaged in misconduct because Mr. Pickens cannot prove that the prosecutor knew 
that that evidence was inadmissible (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26); and it argues that, 
even if the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that misconduct was harmless because, 
in its view, Mr. Pickens surely would have been found guilty anyway (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.27-29). As set forth below, none of these arguments have merit. 
1. Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Is Not Procedurally Barred 
As noted, Mr. Pickens contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct for 
highlighting evidence-allegations that Mr. Pickens had said "this time it's not my 
fault"-in her opening statement, which she knew, or should have known, was 
inadmissible under 1.R.E. 404(b) because the State had failed to provide Mr. Pickens 
with prior notice of its intent to use such evidence at trial. With regard to this claim, the 
State arguably seeks to interpose two procedurally bars to having the claim considered 
on its merits. 
a) Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Was Preserved 
Through An Adequate Objection 
The State's primary (or, perhaps, it's only) procedural argument concerning 
Mr. Pickens' prosecutorial misconduct claim is that this is a new claim that was never 
raised below and, thus, cannot be a source of relief on appeal unless any misconduct 
that is found is determined to rise to the level of fundamental error. (Respondent's 
Brief, p.24.) The argument, however, is misplaced. 
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Following the State's opening statement, outside the presence of the jury, 
Mr. Pickens's counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecutor's mention of the 
alleged "this time it's not fault" comment in her opening. (Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.21-22.) 
He argued initially that that alleged statement "infers [sic] this has happened before. It's 
improper character evidence. And it should have been disclosed as 404(b) that they 
intend to use it, which they have not done. I don't know how to unring that bell .... " 
(Tr. Vol. V, p.161, Ls.8-15.) Moments later, he continued, arguing not only that the 
implication of the alleged statement was that something similar had happened before, 
and that the State's intent to offer evidence of that statement should have been 
disclosed in advance of trial as was required under Rule 404(b), but that the matter 
"should not have been brought up in the opening statement" and the prosecutor's doing 
so was "improper." (Tr. Vol. V, p.163, Ls.6-17 (emphasis added).) 
Clearly, the foregoing argument was sufficient to preserve Mr. Pickens' 
prosecutorial misconduct claim for appeal without having to resort to the fundamental 
error doctrine. Although the State now attempts to characterize defense counsel's 
argument as a "notice" objection, not an objection concerning the fact that the evidence 
was inadmissible because of the lack of notice, or an objection to the prosecutor's 
misconduct (Respondent's Brief, p.24), the State's characterization of defense counsel's 
argument is patently meritless. First, by its very nature, an objection to a lack of notice 
being provided under Rule 404(b) is a complaint that the evidence in question cannot, 
therefore, be admitted under Rule 404(b). See I.R.E. 404(b) ("Evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts . . . may . . . be admissible ... provided that the prosecution in a 
criminal case shall file and serve notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of 
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any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial.") Second, in light of the fact that 
defense counsel argued that the prosecutor's mention of the alleged "this time it's not 
my fault" comment was "improper," it is apparent that his prosecutorial misconduct claim 
is preserved. 
b) Mr. Pickens' Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Was Not Waived Or 
Forfeited 
Although it does not actually present any argument asserting that Mr. Pickens' 
prosecutorial misconduct claim was in any way waived or forfeited, the State repeatedly 
points out (in a somewhat misleading manner) that the district court offered to provide 
the jury with "a specific instruction" concerning the alleged "this time it's not my fault" 
comment, but that Mr. Pickens did not avail himself of that instruction. (See 
Respondent's Brief, pp.18, 19.) Thus, the implication from the State is that Mr. Pickens 
could have readily mitigated any prejudice owing to the "this time it's not my fault" 
evidence, but he chose not to do so. 
The reality, however, is that the "specific instruction" offered up by the district 
court would not have mitigated Mr. Pickens' prejudice in the slightest. As was 
discussed in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's Brief, the district court was prepared to instruct the 
jury that there is no claim that Mr. Pickens had been physically or sexually abusive 
toward Ms. Ortiz in the past, thus implying that Mr. Pickens had been physically or 
sexually abusive toward someone else. (See Appellant's Brief, p.17 & n.11, p.26 n.17.) 
Of course, either way, the implication would have been the same: that Mr. Pickens has 
a propensity to commit the type of crimes that he was charged with in this case. Thus, 
the prejudice would have been the same either way. 
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2. The Prosecutorial Statements And Witness Testimony At Issue Clearly 
Fall Within The Ambit Of Rule 404/b) 
The State's primary argument in this case, it seems, is that the alleged "this time 
it's not my fault" statement cannot reasonably be construed as evidence of a prior bad 
act and, thus, does not fall within the ambit of I.RE. 404(b). (Respondent's Brief, pp.19, 
20-23.) Of course, if the evidence in question does not fall within the scope of Rule 
404(b), then the State was not required to provide pretrial notice of its intent to use that 
evidence at trial and, certainly, the prosecutor could not have engaged in misconduct for 
mentioning that evidence in her opening statement without having provided such pretrial 
notice. 
In arguing that the alleged "this time its not my fault" statement does not fall 
within the reach of Rule 404(b), the State argues that that alleged statement is "vague," 
"confusing," and "non-descript," and, thus, there is no way a jury could have taken it to 
have been a reference to a prior physical or sexual assault by Mr. Pickens. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.21-23.) Such an argument though, is belied by the evidence 
itself. The quote attributed to Mr. Pickens is that "this time it's not my fault." The clear 
import of this alleged statement is Mr. Pickens admitted that some other time it was his 
fault. Thus, when the jury heard this argument and evidence, it would have undoubtedly 
been left with the impression that whatever scuffle, fight, or argument that caused 
Mr. Pickens' cousin to peek into Mr. Pickens' bedroom was similar to some other 
incident, at some other time, where he had been at fault. By definition, this is 
"[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts," and, thus, it clearly falls within the scope of 
Rule 404(b). 
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3. Even If Mr. Pickens Cannot Prove That The Prosecutor Actually Knew 
That The Evidence She Was Highlighting In Her Opening Statement Was 
Inadmissible Under Rule 404(b). She Certainly Should Have Known That 
It Was Inadmissible 
The State further argues that, even if evidence of the alleged "this time it's not my 
fault" statement was inadmissible pursuant under Rule 404(b), Mr. Pickens nevertheless 
failed to establish prosecutorial misconduct because he failed to prove that the 
prosecutor knew it was inadmissible under Rule 404(b) when she highlighted it in her 
opening statement. (Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.) The crux of this argument is that, 
because the district court ultimately determined that the alleged "this time it's not my 
fault" statement was admissible, the prosecutor could not have known otherwise. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.25-26.) 
There are two significant flaws with the State's argument. First, because we can 
never know what the prosecutor actually knew, the relevant question ought to be what 
she should have known. See Mattson v. Bryan, 92 Idaho 587,592,448 P.2d 201, 206 
(1968) (implying that it is improper for counsel to highlight evidence that she does not 
have "reasonable ground to believe" will be admissible). In other words, a prosecutor's 
ignorance ought not to be an excuse for depriving the defendant of a fair trial and due 
process of law. In this case, therefore, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct because 
she certainly should have recognized that the "this time it's not my fault" statement was 
evidence of another crime, wrong, or act under Rule 404(b), and, under Rule 404(b), 
pretrial notice of the State's intent to use such evidence was strictly required. 
Second, hindsight, i.e., whether the district court ultimately admitted the 
evidence, ought not to be the guide in determining whether the prosecutor knew, or 
should have known, that the evidence she was highlighting in her opening statement 
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would be admissible. Indeed, if hindsight were the guide, a legal error by the district 
court in admitting a certain piece of evidence would shield the prosecutor from scrutiny 
of even the most egregious misconduct. 
4. The Prosecutor's Misconduct Was Not A "Harmless" Error 
Finally, the State contends that even if the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
referring to evidence which she knew, or should have known, was inadmissible, her 
misconduct in this case was nevertheless harmless (such that Mr. Pickens is not 
entitled to a new trial) because, in the State's view, Mr. Pickens is undoubtedly guilty. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.27-29.) This argument, however, evidences a 
misunderstanding of the harmless error standard. 
In determining whether a constitutional error is harmless, the reviewing court 
determines whether it appears, beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not 
contribute to the jury's verdict. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). "To say 
that an error did not contribute to the verdict is ... to find that error unimportant in 
relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question, as revealed in 
the record." Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 403 (1991). The issue is whether the jury 
actually rested its verdict on evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the 
inadmissible evidence. Id. at 404-05. "The inquiry, in other words, is not whether, in a 
trial that occurred without the error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, 
but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to 
the error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279 (1993) (emphasis added). 
Applying the Chapman standard correctly, it is clear that the prosecutor's 
misconduct was not harmless because, as was discussed at length in Mr. Pickens' 
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opening brief, arguments and evidence implying that Mr. Pickens had been guilty of one 
or more similar acts previously was highly prejudicial to Mr. Pickens, especially in light 
of the fact that this entire case turned on the alleged victim's credibility and that alleged 
victim had a powerful motive to lie. (See Appellant's Brief, pp.23-25.) 
C. The District Court Erred In Concluding That Evidence That Mr. Pickens Had Said 
"This Time It's Not My Fault" Was Admissible 
As noted, in addition to arguing that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by 
referencing the alleged "this time it's not my fault" evidence in her opening, Mr. Pickens 
also asserts that the district court's ruling as to the admissibility of such evidence was in 
error-both because the State failed to provide prior notice of its intent to use the 
evidence (as is required under Rule 404(b)), and because the evidence is irrelevant or, 
if somewhat relevant, its probative value is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-30.) In its Respondent's Brief, the State does not 
address this argument directly; however, as noted above, in arguing that the prosecutor 
did not engage in misconduct by discussing the alleged "this time it's not my fault" 
comment in her opening statement, the State does argue at some length that evidence 
concerning that comment does not fall within the reach of Rule 404(b). (Respondent's 
Brief, pp.19, 20-23.) Because the State's argument in this regard is thoroughly rebutted 
above (see Part 11(8)(2), supra), no further response is necessary. 
In addition, although it does not specifically argue that Mr. Pickens' evidentiary 
claim is procedurally barred, the State does correctly observe that "Pickens' trial 
counsel did not object to either Cynthia's or Rachel's testimony concerning Pickens' 
'this time' comment .... " (Respondent's Brief, p.19.) Insofar as this observation 
constitutes an invitation for this Court to hold that any claim of error in the district court's 
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admission of this evidence was waived through defense counsel's failure to object, that 
invitation ought to be declined. As was pointed out in Mr. Pickens' opening brief 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.25-26), and as the State concedes (Respondent's Brief, p.25), in 
denying Mr. Pickens' motion for a mistrial, the district court implicitly ruled that evidence 
of Mr. Pickens' alleged "this time it's not my fault" comment was admissible. Since the 
district court ruled on that precise issue, it is properly before this Court on appeal, even 
in the absence of a contemporaneous objection to the State's proffered testimony. See 
State v. Duvall, 131 Idaho 550, 553, 961 P.2d 641, 644 (1998) ("This Court has held 
that ordinarily issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. . . . An exception to 
this rule, however, has been applied by this Court where the issue was argued to or 
decided by the trial court."); cf. State v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 699, 760 P.2d 27, 38 
(1988) (holding that where there has been a pretrial ruling on the admissibility of a piece 
of evidence, the opponent of that evidence "need not repeat his objection when the 
evidence is offered during the trial"). 
Finally, insofar as the State argues that, even if the district court erred in allowing 
the State to offer evidence of Mr. Pickens' alleged statement that "this time it's not my 
fault," that error is harmless (see respondent's Brief, pp.27-29), that argument fails for 
the same reasons articulated above. (See Part 11(8)(4), supra.) 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, as well as in Mr. Pickens' Appellant's Brief, 
Mr. Pickens respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and sentences, 
and remand his case for a new trial on the rape and kidnapping charges or, in the 
alternative, that it vacate his conviction and sentence for assault with the intent to 
commit a serious felony (rape). 
DATED this 30th day of October, 2009. 
~ ~ 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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